Chapter IX of the Report by the Three-Member Investigative Committee is the most accusatory and revealing part of the findings, as it focuses exclusively on identifying and attributing political, criminal, and disciplinary responsibility to individuals involved, directly or indirectly, in the Takata airbag scandal.
According to Term of Reference 4(2)(z), the Committee was obliged to examine whether the findings revealed facts or evidence that could indicate responsibility “on the part of any involved person,” due to actions or omissions. The scope of this mandate is substantial: it is not limited to intent or malice, but considers responsibility even from the perspective of negligent performance of duties.
The notion of “responsibility”, as clarified in the report, includes not only legal obligations but also moral, professional, and social accountability. As stated: “Power comes with many privileges, but those are accompanied by many responsibilities.”
Political responsibilities
The Committee finds that for years, a culture of denying responsibility prevailed at the Ministry of Transport – specifically at the Department of Road Transport (TOM). The stance expressed by former Directors of the TOM that “the responsibility for recalls rested solely with the manufacturer” is characterised by the Committee as “distorted” and dangerous, as the state is not merely a relay of letters but a supervisory authority with responsibility towards its citizens.
Ministers who served at the Ministry of Transport, Communications and Works (ΥΜΕΕ) are also placed under scrutiny. The Committee stresses that the executive branch is not simply administrative, but fundamentally accountable for the enforcement of laws, the political guidance of its services, and the overall protection of public interest. The failure to exercise oversight and to monitor the performance of services falls, according to the report, under political responsibility.
Criminal and disciplinary responsibilities
Although the Committee does not have the power to assign criminal or disciplinary guilt, it explicitly refers evidence to the Attorney General. Specifically regarding the TOM and the Department of Electromechanical Services (EMS), the Committee documents acts or omissions that may constitute criminal liability, such as the failure to inform other authorities (e.g., the Road Safety Council) or failure to manage serious information related to public safety.
Reference is also made to potential offences of abuse of power, with the observation that certain decisions or suppression of critical data could be interpreted as such. This responsibility, as recorded, is not limited to civil servants but may extend to the respective Ministers.
In the chapter on disciplinary responsibility, the Committee outlines the relevant legal framework (Article 60 of Law 1/90) and notes that several public servants did not act with “impartiality, objective criteria, and fidelity to the law.” Indifference or professional complacency—such as that recorded in the 2017 TOM Circular—cannot, according to the Committee, go unpunished.
Institutional paralysis and moral indifference
In essence, this chapter serves as an indictment of an entire culture of governmental apathy. The Committee speaks of a widespread shifting of responsibility, where no one assumes accountability, creating “a climate of political indifference and social fatalism.” It warns that public trust in the state collapses when institutions fail to act and are not held accountable.
Conclusion
The report concludes as follows:
“Following the above, the Committee considers that with the fulfilment of Term 4(2)(z), it has completed the task assigned to it on 12 March 2025 by the Attorney General of the Republic. As final observations, the Committee makes the following points:
Testimonies heard by the Committee:
1. The current and eight (8) former Ministers of the ΥΜΕΕ:
The Committee’s finding is that the Ministers who served between 2013 and 2023 bear serious political responsibility, which none of them acknowledged or accepted. They claimed they were not informed about the Takata airbag issue or how the TOM was handling it. Had they known, they claimed, they would have taken action—as they allegedly did in other matters during their tenure.
The Committee deems such arguments dismissive of two key facts: first, that ministerial responsibility “… is objective; a minister does not need to have direct personal involvement in an issue to be held accountable,” and second, that “… if those at the top of the political and social pyramid do not assume responsibility for their actions and omissions, they encourage the entrenchment of general political impunity,” and that by not accepting responsibility, they fail to “… cultivate genuine trust between citizens and the State and its institutions.”
2. The current and six (6) former Permanent Secretaries of the ΥΜΕΕ or the former Ministry of Communications and Works:
A disheartening finding of the Committee—regarding five (5) out of the six (6) former Permanent Secretaries—is the ease with which they offered the disarming excuse that they were also unaware of the Takata issue, or of vehicle recalls in general and how these were managed by the ΤΟΜ. They stated that EMS had not shared its reports with them, as it should have, and that it was impossible for the ministry’s management to adequately supervise the many departments and services due to a lack of personnel on the ground.
However, these excuses amount to an admission of inadequacy in fulfilling their duties as Permanent Secretaries. They overlook the fact that by accepting their appointments, they assumed responsibility for the proper and effective organisation, direction, and supervision of their ministry’s departments and services, as well as the necessary coordination—responsibilities which, by their own admission, they failed to fulfil.
3. The current and four (4) former Directors or Acting Directors of the ΤΟΜ:
As previously noted, during the critical period (2013–2023), a perception became established and entrenched at the ΤΟΜ that responsibility for recalls and risk assessment lay solely with the manufacturer. The ΤΟΜ considered its only duty to be the forwarding of updated owner data to the manufacturer of the recalled vehicles.
This perception is described as distorted and dangerous because, in reality, the ΤΟΜ transferred its responsibilities to external, non-governmental entities, effectively turning the department from a guardian of road safety into a courier of information to third parties. As a result, the department displayed inexcusable indifference and inaction despite repeated warnings and information regarding the dangers posed by Takata airbags. It failed, as it was legally obliged to, to assess the risk and thereby activate its duty to act under the law, regulations, and its mission.
4. The President of SEMHO and representatives of vehicle importers, as well as PASEA representatives:
Based on their testimony, the Committee formed the view that their strong opposition to recalls was driven primarily by financial interests. While the Committee acknowledges their motivations, it emphasises that the State’s primary duty is the safety of its citizens. When such an issue arises, economic interests must be secondary.
Therefore, if the authorities fail to balance the conflicting interests of the economic actors involved, they have no choice but to impose solutions—through regulations or decrees—that serve public safety, regardless of political or other cost. This must always be within the framework defined by Regulation (EU) 2018/858, for the reasons previously outlined.
5. The Directors of EMS and the Police Traffic Department:
The testimony of these two officials revealed that there is a lack of the necessary cooperation and information-sharing between state services on road safety issues. It also showed that the multi-member Road Safety Council deals with many matters but falls short in fulfilling its core mission of ensuring road safety.
Most concerning is the widespread “blame game” and refusal to take responsibility, along with entrenched and dangerous mentalities that must be eradicated and replaced by a mindset focused on serving public interest.
To achieve this, the Committee stresses that individuals appointed to key positions must, in addition to qualifications, possess the awareness that high office carries not just privileges but also substantial responsibilities—responsibilities they must be prepared to assume and accept the consequences for, in the event of failure.
Also read: Takata airbag report exposes failures and liabilities
