A new book recently published by Oxford University Press is set to become a key reference for historians, journalists, and researchers worldwide. Authored by historian Tom Wells, the book includes transcripts of more than 15,000 secret telephone conversations recorded by Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, during the Nixon administration (1969–1974). These conversations shed light on major historical events, from the Vietnam War to the Cyprus crisis, and reveal the inner workings of one of the most controversial figures in modern diplomacy.
Chapter 31 of the book is particularly significant for Cyprus. It covers the Greek-backed coup against President Makarios, his subsequent escape, the brief Sampson “presidency”, the Clerides solution, the prevention of a Greco-Turkish war, the Sisco mission, and various State Department interventions.
Tom Wells: The historian behind the research
Tom Wells, who holds a PhD in sociology from UC Berkeley, has written three other books and received multiple fellowships and grants from American universities and foundations. He resides in New Mexico. Wells explains in his introduction how he meticulously collected and analysed around 20,000 pages of Kissinger’s conversations, providing an unprecedented insight into the US approach to international crises during Nixon’s presidency.
Wells portrays Kissinger as a complex figure – brilliant, strategic, and influential, yet ruthless and manipulative. He writes:
“Henry Kissinger is one of the most polarising figures in American history. Many regard him as a master of diplomacy and realpolitik. Critics, however, condemn him for his role in the Vietnam War, the genocide in East Pakistan, the overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende, and support for the Pinochet dictatorship.”
Kissinger’s motives behind the secret recordings
Kissinger recorded his conversations for personal use, to maintain control, and possibly as preparation for future memoirs, although he denied the latter. Close associates note that his chaotic work habits contributed to his decision. Wells observes:
“He likely intended the transcripts as leverage against opponents or as self-protection. His thirst for power, combined with extreme behaviour, drove him to actions that were illegal, yet historically revealing, with consequences for countries like Cyprus.”
The mechanics of Kissinger’s surveillance
Initially, Kissinger relied on secretaries to take notes. Later, he installed recording devices for high-quality, complete documentation. Secretaries often worked late into the night transcribing conversations verbatim before the tapes were destroyed.
While aware of the legal risks, Kissinger did not conceal his recordings from close aides and often mocked his interlocutors with gestures and expressions. Even President Nixon knew of the practice, and administration officials were cautious in their communications with him. Kissinger would lie when asked about recordings, a reflection of his calculated and manipulative personality.
A master of media manipulation
Wells also details Kissinger’s interactions with journalists. According to Roger Morris, a National Security Council staffer:
“He spent more time on the phone with journalists than with anyone in government. He seduced and manipulated them; they respected him and sought his guidance, becoming conduits for his agendas.”
Kissinger also held extensive conversations with foreign leaders, ambassadors, members of Congress, and business elites, often disparaging them privately as “certified idiots.” His calls reveal a mixture of raw insults, strategic planning, humour, sarcasm, and moments of unruffled calm.
Cyprus: Managing a crisis
Regarding Cyprus, Kissinger opposed the return of Makarios, fearing communist influence if the Archbishop regained power. He described Sampson, who briefly assumed the presidency after the coup, as a “dead duck” and considered the Clerides solution, proposed by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, as an interim measure. The United States avoided public support for either faction, prioritising the prevention of a Greco-Turkish war. Wells highlights that the transcripts demonstrate Kissinger handling the situation almost single-handedly, often announcing developments before they occurred.
Handling the recordings
In 1976, Kissinger moved the archive to a secure location owned by Nelson Rockefeller, treating the transcripts as personal documents. Multiple lawsuits failed to gain access, though investigative journalists, including Costas Venizelos and Michalis Ignatiou, later uncovered evidence of Kissinger’s role in the 1974 events, as documented in The Secret Files of Kissinger. The late Christopher Hitchens also criticised him in The Trial of Henry Kissinger.
The author’s insights on Kissinger’s pivotal role
In Chapter 31 (pp. 559–581), which examines the Cyprus issue, Tom Wells highlights Kissinger’s proactive involvement. He knew in advance about Greece’s plan to overthrow Makarios and opposed removing the Greek officers in charge of the National Guard. Kissinger feared that if the Archbishop sought Soviet assistance to regain power, it could allow communists to emerge as the dominant force in Cyprus. The U.S. avoided publicly backing either Makarios or Sampson, prioritising the prevention of a Greece-Turkey war. The transcripts reveal that Kissinger, rather than President Nixon, largely managed the crisis, often announcing developments well before they actually occurred.
First glimpses of the tapes
KISSINGER-ANATOLY DOBRYNIN, SOVIET AMBASSADOR—15/7/1974, 05:30 p.m. (US Time)
K.: We just received a message from Cyprus that your advisor asked the British High Commissioner how the British would feel about the intervention of Soviet troops to restore order.
D.: Troops? I doubt that very much; it sounds incredible to me.
K.: And to me. If you were planning something like that, would you tell us?
D.: Yes.
K.: You know we would not favour it.
D.: I know. What is happening with Makarios?
K.: I have a report from Israel. They say they heard him on the radio.
D.: I know that this (returns to the troops) could only happen if Makarios requested it and then it would have to be discussed.
KISSINGER-CALLAGHAN, UK FOREIGN SEC—16/7/74, 10:15 a.m.
Cal.: Makarios asked us for permission to go to the area of our base. We gave it to him and now we are thinking of embarking him on our plane.
K.: If that is the issue, okay; we don’t want him leading a movement and asking for help from the Soviets.
Cal.: Correct. I am going to make a statement in the House of Commons. I will say that he asked us to go to our base. I will continue by saying that our ambassador is informing the Greek government that the Greek military personnel of the National Guard must be replaced as soon as possible.
K.: Wait, I think we should not make a quick decision about that.
Cal.: That would reduce the tension in the area.
K.: As soon as the situation clears up, fine. But if there is a civil war, we will get involved.
Cal.: How do you see that?
K.: If Makarios leaves the island, my assessment will be different than if he stays and leads a civil war. My main concern is to keep external forces out of it. We can ask the Greek government to declare its intentions. For the Greek military who are there, we will return to it, but not today. As soon as things clear up, then we can do something. We do not support Enosis.
KURT WALDHEIM, UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, BRIEFS KISSINGER—16/7/74, 11:50 a.m.
[NO COMMENT FROM KISSINGER]
Waldheim: I received a telegram from my special representative in Cyprus stating that Makarios may request a meeting of the Security Council to discuss what he calls Greek military intervention in Cyprus. We know that four Greeks are hospitalized with injuries sustained during the coup, therefore there was Greek involvement. I want you to know that we have these indications that the Greek military corps is involved. The Archbishop asked the British to send a helicopter to transport him to their base on the island and the British High Commissioner accepted, on the condition that the Archbishop would agree to be transferred to the United Kingdom. Makarios refused and I have authorized our general to provide protection. For us it will be a problem if the new military government has control but a president is not sworn in. We will have a problem with what to do with Makarios. The important thing is to avoid intervention by the Turks. This is the real danger.
Kissinger and Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, on July 16, 1974, at 12 noon (US time).
Dobrynin: “Henry, I received another telegram from Moscow. They have organised a military coup. Justice demands that the Soviet Union, the United States and all countries put an end to military intervention in the affairs of Cyprus. The most urgent thing now is for the Security Council to adopt a resolution to end Greece’s intervention.”
Kissinger: “Our position is that we want more information.”
Dobrynin: “That only and nothing else?”
Kissinger: “Today we are not going to support a resolution.”
Dobrynin: “Can you give me your position briefly?”
Kissinger: “We will oppose union between Cyprus and Greece.”
Dobrynin: “Yes. As for immediate withdrawal, you are not prepared to do that today?”
Kissinger: “No.”
Dobrynin: “And if a resolution is tabled, what will you do?”
Kissinger: “We will try to avoid a vote.”
Dobrynin: “Well then, what is your personal opinion, Henry?”
Kissinger: “I want to see what the situation is on the island.”
Dobrynin: “The situation could be dealt with if you and we took a position.”
Kissinger: “It depends on whether there will still be a government there.”
Dobrynin: “Makarios is still there in a United Nations camp.”
Kissinger–Callaghan, UK Foreign Secretary, July 17, 1974, 2.50 p.m.
Callaghan: “We believe the ideal solution would be to get Makarios back. Whether we can do it by diplomatic means remains to be seen. Makarios asked for diplomatic activity to continue and for the new regime in Cyprus not to be recognised. We assess that the situation will be more tense if we do not get Makarios back. The question is, can we?”
Kissinger: “Why should a compromise not be Clerides?”
Callaghan: “A compromise could be elections in three months with Makarios back on the island.”
Kissinger: “But how will you get him back?”
Callaghan: “We hope you will use your influence with the Greek government. We believe that if there is coordinated diplomatic pressure, they may calm things down by withdrawing some of their officers. My view is that it is better to have Makarios there than Sampson.”
Kissinger: “That is true, I agree.”
Kissinger: “The chances are small, but it would be worth doing. If Sampson stays, he will be accused of running a fascist regime and the Russians will intensify their activity, so… We could force the regime and have Sampson withdrawn.”
Kissinger: “We agree with the general approach. We are not very far apart on this.”
Kissinger: “I do not think we have the luxury of losing much time before we start putting pressure on the Greeks.”
Kissinger–President Nixon, July 17, 1974, 4.30 p.m.
Nixon: “How are we doing with our Greek friends?”
Kissinger: “The problem in Cyprus is that the Europeans have taken a united position that Makarios must return and they want us to put pressure on the Greeks. My concern is that Makarios will rely on the communists and the Eastern Bloc. My recommendation is that we work for a compromise in which neither Makarios nor the other fellow [meaning Sampson] takes over. They want us to… wipe out the Greeks, but if they are overthrown [meaning the junta] then that will endanger our entire position.”
Nixon: “I know that, but there is not much support from Europe [meaning in favour of Makarios]?”
Kissinger: “If everyone runs to Makarios, embracing him as the lawful leader, and if the Soviets are the only ones offering to help restore him, we will have no basis to resist.”
Nixon: “I see the danger. We do not have any support.”
Kissinger: “We cannot openly oppose Makarios, but we can try to slow it down enough and secure support for an internal solution. If the Greeks collapse, then the Left could take over, or a bunch of Greek colonels who could align themselves with Gaddafi. My analysis is that if Makarios returns in this way, he will have to expel the Greek officers from the island, and then the communists will be the dominant force and, to balance the Turks, he will have to rely on the Eastern Bloc.”
Nixon: “I understand. Pity he has to return.”
Kissinger–Robert McCloskey, US deputy secretary of state, July 19, 1974, 9.30 a.m.
McCloskey: “There are many reports that Turkish naval units are moving from south-eastern Turkey towards Cyprus.”
Kissinger: “Yes, I have the impression they will go in tomorrow morning. Send a telegram to Sisco [Joseph Sisco, US deputy secretary of state] telling him that as soon as he arrives, he is to tell Ecevit that we are extremely concerned about Turkish military movements. He must do that at once. Second, tell him we are doing this in Turkey’s interest, that Turkish intervention will not be the last move, it will be the first in a whole series of moves.”
Kissinger–Robert Ingersoll, US deputy secretary of state, July 19, 1974, 3.40 p.m.
Kissinger: “I have just received Scali’s speech [the US ambassador to the UN], in which he referred to Makarios at one point as President and at another as Archbishop. I regard this as yet another example of complete indiscipline. Do you assume that calling Makarios President makes no difference?”
Ingersoll: “Archbishop is what we had in the text. I do not know where he got President Makarios from.”
Kissinger: “It must remain Archbishop Makarios. Let us put an end to his… grand flights in policy-making.”
Kissinger to McCloskey, July 19, 1974, 7.30 p.m.
Kissinger: “Sisco must go to Athens. Tell him to bring up the Clerides solution. [The option of a transitional Clerides solution had also been mentioned in an earlier Kissinger conversation, before the invasion broke out, as he wanted at all costs to bypass Makarios, whom he disliked and did not hide it.] Second, tell them that we recommend they do not go to war. The consequences for everyone, including themselves, would be disastrous.”
McCloskey: “Mr Secretary, what would you say if we called an immediate meeting of the UN Security Council and asked for…”
Kissinger: “No, no. Good God, no. I do not want to bring the Russians in yet.”
Kissinger–President Nixon, July 19, 1974, 8.00 p.m.
Kissinger: “Mr President, it appears the Turks will land in Cyprus within an hour, if they have not already landed there. We will urge the Greeks to accept the Clerides solution as head of the House. They will never accept Makarios. If they do not accept Clerides, we will have a war between the Greeks and the Turks. We must stop military supplies to both. There is no sense in having an open pipeline to two Nato allies fighting each other.”
Nixon: “I suppose there is no way to prevent the Turks from doing this?”
Kissinger: “Frankly, we did not think they would move so quickly. We sent them a very strong note about eight hours ago telling them it would have very serious consequences.”
Nixon: “Where do you come out?”
Kissinger: “We will tilt towards the Turkish side by pressing for Clerides. The Greeks will not like that.”
Nixon: “All right. Let us push all the way.”
Kissinger to James Schlesinger, US defence secretary, July 19, 1974, 9.45 p.m.
Kissinger: “I believe that what my colleagues want to do, namely, come out all in favour of Makarios and against Athens, will create turmoil in Greece and we will lose the only certain base we have in the eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, I want us to move in such a way that Makarios does not return and that we go to some solution such as Clerides. But for that, we need to create a temporary deadlock. That is why we are moving so slowly.”
Kissinger–President Nixon [outside Washington], July 19, 1974, 10.06 p.m.
Nixon: “Obviously, the battle has started, eh?”
Kissinger: “Yes, they are bombing Nicosia and we have not yet had any Greek reaction. I have Sisco going to Athens under protest, because he believes it may be a little dangerous for him there.”
Nixon: “Dangerous in the sense of anti-Americanism?”
Kissinger: “Yes. Never mind, Mr President, that is what they pay deputy secretaries for.”
Nixon: “Do you think I should come back?”
Kissinger: “Not yet, but if the Greeks attack the Turks, then I think you should return to Washington. There is a chance this thing could be settled by Monday. If the Greeks accept Clerides and then meet in London, I think we could achieve a ceasefire.”
Nixon: “What would the Greeks do?”
Kissinger: “Either they will negotiate, or they will attack the Turks in Thrace. If Sisco has not completely lost his nerve, I think they can negotiate.”
“They are landing in the north, they have landed in Nicosia…”
Kissinger–William Colby, CIA director, July 19, 1974, 10.35 p.m.
Colby: “They are landing on the northern coast, they have landed in Nicosia by air and there is a force moving towards Famagusta from which we have had no further reports.”
Kissinger: “I do not know where the hell Famagusta is. Do you mean they are moving overland? Will they take the whole island?”
Colby: “They have landed in Kyrenia on the northern coast and have dropped paratroopers into Nicosia.”
Kissinger: “Why?”
Colby: “Because it is the capital and because there is a Turkish population up to Kyrenia in the north, so they can link up easily.”
Kissinger: “Do you think they will take Nicosia?”
Colby: “Yes, there will be fighting. They will land at the airport, link up with the soldiers coming from the sea and then fight the National Guardsmen. They also have a separate landing above Famagusta and perhaps one at Larnaca. The aim is to try to establish themselves in three or four places and then negotiate. The Greeks cannot move a large force to Cyprus.”
Kissinger: “You mean they will defend themselves only with what they have on the island?”
Colby: “With the National Guard, about 30,000 troops. There is also the problem of Makarios, some forces in the mountains with the idea of continuing resistance in his favour.”
Kissinger: “I suppose Sampson is a dead duck.”
Colby: “Those fellows will fight the Turks quite hard.”
Kissinger: “Could it end in double enosis?”
Colby: “It may end with the Turks not holding the whole island, but having a base, and with discussion and diplomacy seeing whether they end up with double enosis or not.”
Kissinger: “What we told Sisco was to try the Clerides solution in Athens, to persuade them to get rid of Sampson.”
Colby: “That is one possibility. But the other possibility is to get Makarios back there.”
Kissinger: “How am I going to get him back?”
Colby: “By plane.”
Kissinger: “You mean I should go with him?”
Colby: “Yes. The only problem with my particular plan is which Greek you would take with you.”
Kissinger: “What about the dictator Dimitrios Ioannidis?”
Colby: “No, you would need someone else. If Makarios goes back, then Ioannidis is discredited. You cannot humiliate the Greeks; it must be a Greek solution acceptable to the Turks. We have detected no movement from the Soviet side, no fleets or anything else.”
“Ioannidis’ word of honour is a joke…”
Kissinger–Bulent Ecevit, Turkish prime minister, July 21, 1974, 10.40 a.m.
[Kissinger met him in 1957, when he was a student at Harvard in an international seminar run by Kissinger.]
Ecevit: “We are in the middle of a meeting. We have a problem. We doubt Greece’s reliability. Ioannidis’ word of honour is a joke. He said we could fire on any ships flying Greek flags. But their ships are flying Turkish flags.”
Kissinger: “Well, no one can blame you if you sink your own ships.”
Ecevit: “No, Dr Kissinger, they are not our ships. They are Greek ships flying Turkish flags.”
Kissinger: “Yes, Mr Prime Minister, you can sink them, since they are not your own.”
Ecevit: “They are using tricks. We are Nato allies and their pilots know our codes. They speak Turkish. They call our pilots in Turkish using our code words. We can no longer rely on Greece’s word. They say they want a ceasefire. It has become obvious that they want to use the ceasefire to gather troops on the island.”
Kissinger: “Are you telling me you will not accept a ceasefire?”
Ecevit: “We will accept it, but they had given us their word that no Greek ship would be around Cyprus. We cannot rely on them.”
Kissinger–Callaghan, July 22, 1974, 11.25 a.m.
Callaghan: “We must get rid of that fellow Sampson quickly.”
Kissinger: “We will support it. I am seeing Makarios this afternoon and… I’m going to play it rather cool.”
Callaghan: “Do not be…, you must recognise that he is the lawful president until other arrangements are made.”
Kissinger: “Correct. No, no, I will be very friendly, but I will not commit myself.”
Callaghan: “I am telling you, we will have to move very delicately on this, Henry.”
Kissinger: “Relaxed and very friendly.”
Callaghan: “And you must be absolutely filthy with Sampson.”
Kissinger: “You can count on that too [laughter].”
And all this while, in Cyprus, we were weeping over ruins, while in August the betrayal and the disaster would be completed.
Also read: Rosicrucians: Secret society at the heart of Cyprus political storm
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