Red Sea risks are not limited to the possibility of a direct military threat. For an island whose economy and shipping sector depend heavily on maritime routes, instability around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait can translate into higher transport costs, supply-chain disruption and increased strategic exposure.
The Houthis’ attacks on commercial shipping have already disrupted traffic through the Red Sea and Suez Canal. UN Trade and Development has warned that ships diverted around the Cape of Good Hope face longer journeys, higher costs and wider repercussions for global trade.
By Christopher Stavrou Pitsillides
From Suez to Cyprus
On November 17, 1869, the Suez Canal officially opened, linking the Mediterranean with the Red Sea and dramatically shortening the maritime route between Europe and Asia.
Nine years later, in 1878, Britain assumed administration of Cyprus under the Cyprus Convention with the Ottoman Empire.
Officially, the agreement was linked to containing Russian expansion and supporting the Ottoman Empire. But the island’s position in the eastern Mediterranean, close to the Suez route and on the way towards British interests in India, also gave Cyprus strategic value.
Almost a century and a half later, history is returning from the same maritime corridor.
Not with British battleships, but with ballistic missiles, unmanned aircraft and an armed movement from Yemen that has demonstrated how a narrow maritime passage can become a source of pressure on the global economy.
The strategic importance of Bab el-Mandeb
The Houthis, officially Ansar Allah, emerged as a Zaidi political and religious movement in northern Yemen. They later developed into a military and political force controlling Sanaa and large parts of the country.
Their relationship with Iran has provided political support and, according to international assessments, assistance including military expertise and weapons.
Following the outbreak of the Gaza war, the Houthis began launching missiles towards Israel and attacking commercial vessels in the Red Sea, saying they were acting in solidarity with Palestinians.
The attacks have affected vessels with varying degrees of alleged connection to Israel, while the security threat has prompted major shipping companies to alter their routes.
The key point is Bab el-Mandeb, the “Gate of Tears”. The narrow strait connects the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and, through the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean.
Oil, fuel, food, raw materials and vast quantities of containerised goods pass through this maritime corridor.
The strait does not have to be formally closed to create disruption. If the route becomes sufficiently dangerous, insurance costs rise and shipping companies can divert vessels around the Cape of Good Hope.
That is precisely what happened during the Red Sea crisis. UNCTAD reported major disruption to maritime trade flows, while longer routes around Africa increased sailing times and costs.
How the bill reaches Cyprus
This is where the Cyprus dimension begins.
Yemen is thousands of kilometres away. The economic consequences, however, can reach a Cypriot supermarket.
When a vessel avoids the Red Sea and sails around Africa, the journey becomes longer, fuel consumption increases, crews spend more time at sea and cargo deliveries are delayed.
Those additional costs do not simply disappear. They move through the supply chain and can eventually reach consumers.
For an island economy heavily dependent on maritime transport, freedom of navigation is not an abstract geopolitical concept.
It affects the price of fuel, spare parts, electrical equipment, construction materials and goods imported from Asia.
A Cypriot consumer may not know where Bab el-Mandeb is. Their wallet can learn very quickly.
Cyprus is also a maritime centre
Cyprus is not simply a destination for imported goods.
The island has an important maritime cluster, including the Cyprus flag, ship-management companies, insurers, law firms, accountants and financial services operating from Limassol.
Every attack, route diversion and increase in war-risk insurance costs can therefore affect businesses operating from Cyprus.
The Houthis may not know which product will become more expensive in Nicosia. They do, however, understand the economic effect of making commercial vessels hesitate before passing through a strategic maritime chokepoint.
The military dimension
In January 2024, British aircraft took part in strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. The UK government confirmed that RAF Typhoons returned to RAF Akrotiri after the operations.
The Sovereign Base Areas are under British sovereignty, and the Republic of Cyprus does not control British military operations conducted from them.
There is, however, a geographical reality.
From the perspective of someone looking at the region from Yemen, the aircraft involved in those operations took off from an island called Cyprus.
That does not establish a confirmed Houthi threat against the Republic of Cyprus. Nor does it in itself justify alarm.
It does, however, underline the need for political awareness, diplomatic clarity and serious preparedness.
The absence of a direct threat is not the same as the absence of risk.
What should Cyprus prepare for?
The Republic of Cyprus needs to understand what military activity is taking place from the island, what political perceptions this creates in the region and what protection is available for ports, airports, energy facilities, telecommunications networks and other critical infrastructure.
In an era of drones and hybrid warfare, geographical distance is no longer sufficient protection.
Cyprus therefore needs a strategy for the Red Sea rather than simply monitoring developments.
One option would be a permanent inter-agency group bringing together foreign policy, defence, shipping, energy, civil protection and supply-chain security.
Such a structure could assess emerging threats, calculate potential economic consequences and prepare alternative plans for disruptions to maritime routes.
Geopolitics is not managed through statements alone. It also requires scenarios, figures, reserves and decisions made before a crisis.
Balancing Cyprus’ regional role
Cyprus is seeking to play a humanitarian role in the region, including through the maritime corridor for aid to Gaza, evacuation planning and its relations with Israel and Arab states.
That position can provide diplomatic value, but it also requires careful balancing.
The image of a humanitarian bridge can potentially come into tension with the image of an unsinkable aircraft carrier for foreign powers, even when the Republic of Cyprus does not control military operations from the British Bases.
Neutrality, moreover, is not established by declarations alone. It needs to be visible, credible and diplomatically useful.
Geography as an asset and a responsibility
The Houthis have demonstrated an old strategic reality to major powers: a force does not need a large fleet to disrupt a maritime route.
It can be enough to make commercial vessels afraid to use it.
A movement that emerged in one of the world’s poorest countries has consequently forced governments, multinational companies, insurers and navies to reconsider routes and calculations.
In 1878, Cyprus’ geographical position made the island valuable to the British Empire.
Today, the same geography makes it strategically useful, economically vulnerable and potentially exposed.
Geography is not always a privilege. Sometimes it is a responsibility.
And without a strategy, it can become a bill.
The Houthi bill does not have to reach Cyprus by missile. It can arrive inside a container, pass through Limassol port and quietly appear on a Cypriot consumer’s receipt.
The critical question, therefore, is not whether Yemen is far from Cyprus.
It is whether Cyprus has the strategic maturity to recognise early enough what may appear distant but is already travelling towards it.
Also read: 22 September 1940: When Cyprus came under Axis air raids in WWII
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