The plan to overthrow Papadopoulos had been decided well before the Polytechnic uprising. Following those events, the gears were set in motion, and the coup was in its final stages.
Who planned Papadopoulos’ overthrow? Did Ioannides order Makarios’ assassination? Did the Americans send a message to Ioannides, urging him not to depose Cyprus’ Archbishop? Who reassured him that Turkey would not intervene? What new revelations does the son of CIA agent Gus Avrakotos provide? How did Makarios escape? What did Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit say to American diplomats during critical negotiations the day before the invasion? Why did Kissinger himself not go to negotiate directly with Turkey?
All these questions find answers in the fifth and penultimate episode (watch here or on SKAI’s hybrid television by pressing the red button on your remote in the documentary menu) of Alexis Papahelas’ new documentary series “The Dark Decade 1964-1974.”
The decision to remove Papadopoulos had been made long before the Polytechnic events. However, after these incidents, preparations accelerated, setting the coup in motion.
“Greek people, I have decided, following yesterday’s anarchic actions by an organised minority, to declare martial law across the country to restore order. Recent events have demonstrated the presence of a conspiracy against democracy and normality. Greek people, the much-desired internal peace for every honourable citizen will be restored, and the invaluable good of public order will be ensured as our country proceeds towards a stable public life,” Papadopoulos declared in an address.
It seemed to be an open secret. Pattakos learned about it and tried to warn his friend, dictator Papadopoulos.
November 25
Charalambos Palainis took charge of the plan to capture Papadopoulos.
Papadopoulos was overthrown by Dimitrios Ioannides, who did not take any public office. He was the most powerful figure in the country, acting as the unseen dictator.
The first crisis the new regime would face came in autumn 1973 when Ioannides’ junta received initial confidential reports about oil in the Prinos field.
Oil Discovery in the Aegean and the Shady Backstage Dealings
John Day, then head of Greek affairs at the State Department, was in charge of handling the situation. The crisis de-escalated, and Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit met with Andritsopoulos, drawing his own conclusions about the Greek counterpart.
“I tried hard to establish a dialogue with him to resolve issues between our countries, especially regarding the Aegean. But he couldn’t express an opinion on any matter. As prime minister, he evidently had no political power and had to consult Athens even on minor details,” Ecevit said.
Ioannides’ junta was preparing to open a new front in Cyprus. The experienced Foreign Ministry diplomat Angelos Vlachos was in a difficult position: “At that time, we had many signs that something bad was being prepared. I submitted a document demanding a joint meeting between the Ministries of National Defence and Foreign Affairs to set policy. We supported continued dialogue with the Turks and Makarios’ retention in power. Others did everything to destabilise Makarios, possibly even to remove him. But I was certain that the Turks were waiting for the right opportunity to intervene. I resigned on 29 June 1974.”
Diplomat Pavlos Apostolidis, serving at the Greek embassy in Nicosia, recalled the strong anti-Makarios sentiment among Greek officers in Cyprus: “Very soon, we realised that Greek military officers in Cyprus were clearly hostile to Makarios. On the anniversary of the Greek coup, we were invited to a celebration by the Greek Forces in Cyprus (ELDYK). Archbishop Makarios also attended, but the microphone went dead when he tried to speak, symbolising the worsening atmosphere.”
Makarios then sent a harsh letter to Greece’s President Faedon Gizikis, demanding the removal of all Greek officers from Cyprus. He had previously sent this letter to exiled King Constantine and Konstantinos Karamanlis.
Makarios’ ultimatum sparked a fierce reaction from Ioannides.
“He said, ‘With what Makarios is doing, we will lose Cyprus, the Turks will intervene, and we will overthrow him,’” Palainis recounted.
Ioannides initiated the plan to overthrow the Cypriot leader, convinced that Makarios’ removal would not provoke a Turkish response.
Then-Chief of the Navy Petros Arapakis grew concerned about Ioannides’ plans, summoned him to his office, and warned him: “If you do anything against Makarios, you’ll lead the country into a national disaster. It will be a crime.” Ioannides disagreed and left abruptly.
Ioannides proceeded with the coup in Cyprus.
The Coup Against Makarios
Word reached Washington. Diplomat Thomas Boyatt, in charge of Cyprus affairs, prepared a classified memo for Henry Kissinger explaining the critical nature of the situation. However, the memo was lost in the bureaucracy.
The Americans eventually tried to send a message to Ioannides through Ambassador Henry Tasca, a detail vividly remembered by diplomat Angelos Vlachos.
During that period, double messages and big bluffs were common. Ioannides told the Americans one thing but confided differently to his close associates.
Days before the coup, Ioannides sent word to the CIA through an intermediary, claiming he had changed his mind and would not overthrow Makarios.
Coup in Cyprus
There were conflicting reports: one from the CIA stating that Ioannides was no longer interested in intervening in Cyprus and that there was no need to worry about a coup, and another from the embassy in Nicosia stating that a coup was underway. “We were completely blindsided by Ioannides, who was undoubtedly deceiving the US government and using the CIA as a channel. Whether the CIA was involved or who might have been complicit, I don’t know,” Boyatt commented.
On the morning of 15 July, while the coup against Makarios was underway, Ioannides and his associates were in the Pentagon awaiting news from Nicosia. At one point, his adjutant George Stavrou received a strange phone call.
Makarios escaped and found refuge at the British base in Akrotiri. Far away in London, then-Foreign Secretary Callaghan was informed.
Ioannides grew furious upon learning that Makarios had escaped.
The coup, though militarily planned, left many questions unanswered, especially who would replace Makarios.
On 15 July, as hours passed without an official Cypriot government, Nikos Sampson was sworn in as the President of Cyprus. Everyone, including Ioannides, knew he was a red flag for the Turks.
How was Nikos Sampson chosen as President of Cyprus?
Makarios’ overthrow set off alarms in Washington. Kissinger realised that a potential Turkish invasion of Cyprus could spark a wider conflict with Greece, destabilise the region, and risk Soviet involvement. He immediately dispatched Deputy Secretary of State Joe Sisco to London and then to mediate between Athens and Ankara.
Why Kissinger Didn’t Personally Intervene
In London, Ecevit sought approval from the British Foreign Secretary for an official military intervention, which the British refused. However, Turkey remained determined. Sisco met with Ecevit late at night while the Turkish cabinet and generals met in an adjacent room.
The Next Day: The Invasion of Cyprus
On 19 July, Makarios delivered a controversial speech to the UN Security Council, calling the Greek junta’s coup an “invasion” affecting all Cypriots and urging the Security Council to end this “abnormal situation” caused by Athens.
In Athens, an American diplomat met with Ioannides. The unrepentant dictator refused to change his stance, effectively opening the door for a Turkish invasion.
At the same time, Sisco left Athens for Ankara to meet Ecevit. He waited as Ecevit spoke to Kissinger over the phone. The meeting began after midnight, while the Turkish cabinet and generals deliberated in an adjoining room.
In Cyprus, there was widespread chaos, and foreign correspondents crowded into the Ledra Palace Hotel. Meanwhile, life continued as usual on the Kyrenia coast at Five Mile Beach, with local reassurances that the nearby Turkish forces were conducting exercises.
Greek intelligence officer Alexandros Simaioforidis watched as Turkish ships approached.
At the same time, in Athens, the political and military leadership was “sleeping the sleep of the just.”
The following day, 20 July 1974, would change the history of Greece and Cyprus forever.
Source: skai.gr
