In September 1977, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 414 on the Cyprus issue, expressing concern over the situation in Varosha.
It represented a small but significant first battle over the occupied city for Spyros Kyprianou, as Rauf Denktaş and Ankara continued to pursue their objectives regarding Varosha.
In seeking to achieve this, they employed a gradual “salami-slicing” strategy, making changes to the city through settlement on a smaller or larger scale, often discreetly, while creating faits accomplis. Meanwhile, Varosha remained a ghost town, deteriorating as the years passed.
Turning to the United Nations and the Security Council was, during those years, one of the fundamental political strategies consistently pursued by Cyprus. The island found itself largely isolated and vulnerable, relying primarily on support from the Non-Aligned Movement, whose members had votes but lacked executive power, as a veto by a major power could effectively outweigh the votes of numerous countries.
Cyprus nevertheless hoped that the repeated condemnations of Turkey would ensure, if not the return of its occupied territories, at least its survival until more favourable circumstances emerged.
During this period, Denktaş made a tactical move regarding Famagusta, seeking to prevent another appeal to the UN an approach regularly pursued by Cypriot governments at the time and to strengthen Turkey’s efforts to have the arms embargo lifted. In July 1978, he proposed the resumption of negotiations on the Cyprus issue alongside the simultaneous return of Famagusta’s residents.
Spyros Kyprianou responded by proposing the return of residents to a free Famagusta, with their security overseen by UNFICYP, in exchange for the beginning of dialogue aimed at reaching a settlement.
Kyprianou believed that acceptance of his proposal on Varosha could serve as a starting point towards a solution.
However, he made his position clear to Galindo Pohl, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative: Cyprus wanted the return of the entire city of Varosha including its hotels, orange groves and industries not merely a small section of it.
Denktaş, however, was not prepared from the outset to meet Kyprianou’s demands in full. He wanted his actions to be seen as a gesture, but not one significant enough to provoke opposition in Ankara.
According to his proposals, certain areas south of Demokratias Avenue and extending eastwards towards Deryneia Avenue could be returned.
The Americans were closely monitoring developments. US President Jimmy Carter saw that momentum was beginning to build at a time when he was preparing to seek the lifting of the arms embargo on Turkey. According to the article, citing the New York Times, Carter was pursuing a dual strategy: lifting the embargo while simultaneously seeking the return of Famagusta, or at least part of it, to the Greek Cypriots as an initial step.
Carter ultimately succeeded in having the embargo lifted at the end of July 1978, while declaring that the door to a solution of the Cyprus issue would open through Famagusta.
Seeking to maintain the momentum, Carter immediately sent State Department official Matthew Nimetz to Cyprus, where he began contacts aimed at assessing the situation.
President Kyprianou subsequently travelled to the United Nations for the 1978 UN General Assembly and Cyprus’ appeal to the Security Council, holding meetings with Carter and US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.
The timing appeared favourable. Having gained an understanding of the positions of both sides through Nimetz’s mission, the United States had already prepared a plan together with Britain and Canada. Canada also had a particular interest in Cyprus, as Canadian personnel were serving with UNFICYP.
The proposal was presented to the two sides in Cyprus.
The Western Plan and the return of Varosha
The plan, submitted on November 10, 1978, became known as the American-Canadian-British Plan, or simply the Western Plan. In addition to restarting negotiations, it placed particular emphasis on Varosha.
Its authors understood that securing Greek Cypriot support would require offering something significant in return—and that was Varosha.
The proposed resettlement area would include territory east of Agios Nikolaos and south of the old Nicosia-Famagusta road.
Under the plan, the resettlement area would be administered under UNFICYP supervision and regarded as an extension of the UN buffer zone.
There would also be no predetermined numerical limit on the number of people permitted to return. Former residents of the resettlement area would be entitled to return voluntarily, while those who returned to Varosha would not subsequently be forced to leave and become refugees once again.
At the heart of the three countries’ strategic interests was the south-eastern flank of NATO, which had remained divided following Turkey’s 1974 invasion of Cyprus.
The article argues that the three countries had studied the Cyprus issue in considerable depth when preparing the proposal, attempting to accommodate their own interests, those of Greece and Turkey, and those of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.
They therefore proposed what was essentially a federal, bizonal settlement involving significant territorial and refugee returns, alongside a system of government based on equal participation by the two communities.
The plan was described as the best proposal put forward for resolving the Cyprus issue since 1974, but Spyros Kyprianou’s government rejected it. The article attributes the outcome largely to Moscow’s opposition and its influence over AKEL.
According to the article, AKEL, under Secretary-General Ezekias Papaioannou, had initially viewed the proposal positively before the Soviet Union intervened. It subsequently rejected the proposal and influenced the wider political debate surrounding it.
The article maintains that Moscow did not want a settlement that could help bridge divisions within NATO and therefore encouraged AKEL to change its position and oppose the plan.
Glafcos Clerides alone could not significantly influence developments, while Kyprianou and Papaioannou were joined by Vassos Lyssarides’ EDEK, which had strongly opposed the proposal from the beginning.
Demilitarisation and the structure of the proposed settlement
The plan was ambitious. It envisaged a demilitarised island, with the police possessing only light weapons necessary to maintain law and order.
An integral part of a final settlement would have been the withdrawal of non-Cypriot armed forces from the territory of the Republic, with the exception of any forces specifically agreed to remain.
The possibility of gradually demilitarising the Republic of Cyprus could also be considered in a manner intended to provide greater security for both the state and its citizens under a final settlement.
The special provisions for Varosha
The special annex concerning Varosha called on the parties involved in the intercommunal talks to cooperate with the UN Secretary-General and his representatives in determining the conditions for the rapid resettlement of the area.
The guidelines provided that the resettlement area would include territory east of Agios Nikolaos and south of the old Nicosia-Famagusta road.
The area would be administered under United Nations supervision and treated as an extension of the UN buffer zone.
Former residents would be allowed to return voluntarily, with no predetermined numerical limit on those permitted to do so.
Those returning to Famagusta would not be required to leave again against their will.
According to the article, these four provisions would have provided residents with the safeguards needed to return and reinvest in their properties without facing the risk of once again losing them through the intervention of a foreign power, particularly Turkey.
The wider plan
More broadly, the Western Plan envisaged the Republic of Cyprus as a bicommunal federal state comprising two constituent regions one predominantly inhabited by Greek Cypriots and the other predominantly by Turkish Cypriots.
The independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus would be guaranteed, as would its right to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy if it chose to do so.
The incorporation of all or part of the Republic into another state would be prohibited.
A new constitutional structure incorporating an effective federal system of government would be negotiated, guided by the Makarios-Denktaş guidelines of February 1977.
Fundamental rights and freedoms including freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and the right to property would be incorporated into the federal constitution, subject only to modifications considered necessary to preserve the character of each region.
The proposal also envisaged a president and vice-president elected through a democratic process, with one coming from each community. In the president’s temporary absence, the vice-president would assume their duties.
The Astavin intervention that changed the situation
The Western Plan was handed to then-Foreign Minister Nicos Rolandis in New York on November 10, 1978, by State Department official Matthew Nimetz.
The two men already knew one another through the American envoy’s contacts in Nicosia.
President Kyprianou was also in New York, together with party leaders Glafcos Clerides of DISY, Ezekias Papaioannou of AKEL and Vassos Lyssarides of EDEK.
After receiving the proposal and briefly examining it, Rolandis informed the political leaders that it envisaged both the beginning of negotiations and the simultaneous resettlement of Famagusta residents. Those returning would not be required to leave again even if the negotiations ultimately failed.
Lyssarides rejected the proposal almost immediately, although he refrained from publicly expressing his views until returning to Cyprus.
Papaioannou initially viewed it positively, while Clerides, despite having reservations, recommended accepting it.
Rolandis returned to Cyprus as Kyprianou began consultations to assess the political landscape.
Interior Minister Christodoulos Veniamin said that the government, and particularly the president, was studying the matter carefully, seriously and responsibly, guided solely by the interests of the people, and would not rush into saying either “yes” or “no.”
According to Andreas Fantis, then AKEL Deputy Secretary-General, Kyprianou told him during a visit while the president was ill in bed: “Do not worry about Varosha. It has been given. That is certain.”
Lyssarides, upon returning to Cyprus, argued that the plan should be rejected because, in his view, it would create a new framework leading to further concessions and ultimately “national disaster.” He maintained that even if negotiations resumed on the basis of the plan without producing a settlement, the concessions would remain.
Clerides, by contrast, said upon returning to Cyprus that nobody would ever propose a plan entirely favourable to the Greek Cypriot side.
He argued that the proposal should be accepted as a basis for restarting negotiations, while maintaining general reservations over its negative elements. He believed that it was at the negotiating table that a serious effort could be made to turn negative aspects of the framework into positive ones.
AKEL’s change of position
AKEL Secretary-General Ezekias Papaioannou was initially positive towards the proposal. According to later accounts by Andreas Fantis and Tassos Papadopoulos, he sought to persuade others not to reject it before he returned to Cyprus.
His party therefore began contacts aimed at preventing both Archbishop Chrysostomos I and President Kyprianou from publicly opposing the proposal.
It was unable, however, to persuade the Archbishop.
Archbishop Chrysostomos I, Makarios’ successor, joined Lyssarides in opposing the proposal and questioned whether Anglo-American diplomacy was genuinely aimed at achieving justice for Cyprus.
He argued that the proposal was unacceptable in several respects and that it served Turkish interests through what he described as a form of concealed partition.
According to an account later written by Andreas Fantis, Papaioannou called from the United States and urged AKEL not to rush into adopting a position before his return.
Papaioannou had reportedly supported accepting the plan, describing it as highly positive and expressing the view that the Cyprus issue could finally be heading towards a solution. AKEL’s Central Secretariat initially shared that position.
However, following his first contacts after returning to Cyprus, Papaioannou abruptly changed his stance. AKEL, which had been preparing to publicly support the proposal, instead rejected it.
The article attributes this reversal to the position taken by Moscow and the former Soviet Union.
Tassos Papadopoulos later wrote that Pravda, the newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had argued shortly before AKEL announced its position that the Western proposal represented an effort by “imperialist circles” in the West, particularly the United States, to move the Cyprus issue away from the UN framework and towards a settlement shaped behind the scenes within NATO.
Andreas Fantis later wrote in his memoirs that members of AKEL’s Central Secretariat and Political Bureau had been invited to lunch at the home of then-Soviet ambassador Astavin. According to his account, the proposal was discussed and Astavin adopted a clearly negative position. Fantis wrote that the Central Secretariat met the following day and reversed its previous decision.
Following that meeting, Papaioannou said that AKEL would examine any framework presented by the UN Secretary-General but, as a matter of principle, rejected discussion of a Cyprus settlement framework submitted by the United States, Britain, Canada or any other third country, regarding such action as interference in Cyprus’ internal affairs.
Papaioannou also argued that if the Americans wanted to play a peacemaking role in Cyprus, they could have done so by cooperating with the Soviet Union.
Former negotiator and later president Tassos Papadopoulos also opposed the proposal.
He argued that its fundamental weakness was that it divided state sovereignty equally between two separate entities, something he regarded as characteristic of two separate states rather than a single state.
However, when discussing the return of refugees, Papadopoulos acknowledged that the plan could be regarded as perhaps the best and possibly the only opportunity that had existed for the return of at least part of Famagusta and the resettlement of the city’s displaced residents.
President Kyprianou’s position
President Kyprianou did not publicly take a definitive position, while Denktaş waited to see what the Greek Cypriot side would ultimately decide.
Around two years later, Kyprianou’s government spokesperson revealed that the government had agreed to discuss the American proposal as a binding working document alongside other proposals, provided that the resettlement of Varosha’s residents took place simultaneously with the beginning of negotiations.
Against the backdrop of these positions, particularly those of AKEL and DIKO, which supported Kyprianou, the plan was ultimately shelved.
The article concludes that another opportunity for the return of Varosha would have to emerge in later years and argues, with the benefit of hindsight, that any subsequent opportunity would prove less favourable summarising its view of the Varosha issue with the phrase: “the previous year was always better.”
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