Background and overview
The EODASAAM (National Organisation for the Investigation of Aviation and Railway Accidents and Transport Safety) report investigates the head-on collision between a passenger train (IC-62) and a freight train (63503) near Tempi, Greece, on 28 February 2023. The collision resulted in 57 fatalities, 81 serious injuries, and significant infrastructure damage, making it one of Greece’s deadliest railway disasters.
The purpose of the investigation was not to assign blame, but to identify safety failures, systemic issues, and areas for improvement to prevent similar incidents in the future.
Key findings of the investigation
1. Immediate causes of the collision
- The accident occurred because both trains were travelling in opposite directions on the same track between Larissa and Neoi Poroi.
- The Larissa station master failed to set the automated route-setting system, which would have ensured the correct track alignment. Instead, he manually adjusted the switches, forgetting to reset switch 118, sending IC-62 onto the wrong track.
- The train driver did not confirm the departure order properly, and the station master did not notice the mistake.
2. Underlying systemic issues
- Chronic underfunding and lack of investment in railway infrastructure due to Greece’s financial crisis had left the system in a state of neglect.
- Signalling and safety systems were incomplete or non-functional, forcing staff to manually direct train movements, increasing the risk of human error.
- Lack of training and competency monitoring for station masters and train drivers.
- The Railway Safety Authority (RAS) and the infrastructure operator (OSE) failed to identify and address critical safety gaps.
3. Factors that increased the severity of the consequences
- Trains were travelling at high speeds (IC-62: ~150 km/h, Freight Train: ~90 km/h) at the moment of impact.
- Railway vehicles were not designed to withstand high-speed collisions, leading to extensive destruction of the first carriages.
- A massive fireball followed the crash, consuming several carriages. Investigators could not determine the exact cause but suspect the presence of an unidentified flammable substance in the freight train’s cargo.
- Poor coordination in emergency response led to delays in rescue efforts and evidence preservation.
Safety observations and issues in emergency response
- Poor communication and coordination among emergency services resulted in delays and confusion in the aftermath of the accident.
- Failure to properly document and map the accident scene meant that crucial evidence was lost, potentially affecting future safety improvements.
- Psychological support for survivors and affected families was insufficient, with many victims experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Recommendations for improving railway safety
EODASAAM provided 17 safety recommendations, including:
- Improve automated signalling and train protection systems to prevent similar incidents.
- Enhance safety training for station masters and train drivers and introduce continuous performance monitoring.
- Require stricter communication protocols to ensure clear and verified train departure authorisations.
- Strengthen independent oversight by ensuring that RAS and OSE implement proper safety management systems.
- Upgrade railway infrastructure to improve resilience and reduce dependence on human intervention.
- Ensure proper classification and declaration of hazardous materials in freight transport.
- Improve emergency response coordination and ensure regular disaster preparedness drills.
- Implement a national railway safety action plan to ensure long-term structural improvements.
Conclusion
The Tempi train disaster was preventable and resulted from a combination of human error, outdated infrastructure, and systemic failures in railway safety management. The EOADASAAM report highlights critical weaknesses in Greece’s railway system and calls for urgent reforms to prevent future tragedies.
The recommendations provide a roadmap for improving railway safety in Greece, but effective implementation will require political will, financial investment, and strong regulatory oversight.
Also read: Tempi findings report: “Possible presence of unidentified fuel”