Deterrence and Endgame Scenarios Collapse in Third Gulf War

Date:

Dr. Giorgos Kentas, Associate Professor of Politics and Governance at the University of Nicosia, Cyprus

Introduction: A shifting conflict landscape

The current escalation between Iran, Israel, and the United States signals not only the collapse of a fragile deterrence system, but the emergence of what can increasingly be understood as a Third Gulf War. This breakdown is rooted as much in perception as in material capability. From Tehran’s perspective, the growing integration of U.S. and Israeli military power has appeared less as a stabilizing force and more as preparation for inevitable confrontation. Repeated strikes on sensitive infrastructure have reinforced this belief, triggering a dangerous inversion of deterrence logic: actions intended to signal strength and restraint instead validate expectations of conflict, encouraging preemptive and retaliatory escalation.

Why deterrence failed

For some decades, Iran believed its network of regional proxies would raise escalation costs high enough to deter direct attacks. Israel and the United States, by contrast, assumed their technological and operational superiority would prevent Iran from engaging openly. Gulf Arab states relied on U.S. military presence as a protective shield. In practice, none of these assumptions proved resilient.

Iran’s doctrine centered on proxy-based deterrence: a network of allied actors positioned around Israel and near U.S. assets. Hezbollah, the Houthis, militias in Iraq and Syria, and Palestinian groups formed a multi-front system designed to make any attack on Iran trigger uncontrollable escalation. This “encirclement strategy” aimed to create complexity and uncertainty, raising the perceived costs of military action.

However, this architecture proved brittle. Following October 7, 2023, Israel demonstrated deep intelligence penetration and technological superiority, degrading key elements of this network through precision strikes, cyber operations, and sustained aerial campaigns. The rapid erosion of proxy capabilities removed a crucial buffer that had shielded Iran from direct confrontation, exposing it strategically.

Opposing Iran’s model was a deterrence paradigm based on dominance. Israel’s doctrine emphasizes qualitative military superiority—airpower, missile defense, cyber capabilities, and a presumed nuclear deterrent—while the United States reinforces this through extensive regional deployments. This posture was meant to signal overwhelming retaliation against destabilization.

Yet deterrence depends as much on perception as capability. From Tehran’s perspective, increasing U.S.-Israeli integration appeared less defensive and more preparatory for conflict. Strikes on sensitive infrastructure reinforced the belief that confrontation was inevitable. In such conditions, deterrence logic inverts: actions meant to signal strength can instead provoke preemptive or retaliatory escalation.

To offset conventional disadvantages, Iran invested heavily in ballistic missiles and drones, making them central to its deterrence. Its strategy relies on saturation, survivability, and redundancy—using dispersed launch systems and hardened facilities to ensure retaliatory capacity even after initial strikes. This provides a form of strategic parity by enabling Iran to threaten critical infrastructure, energy facilities, and urban centers.

However, this capability is also under strain. Degradation of missile infrastructure and production has reduced effectiveness, pushing Iran toward persistent, lower-intensity disruption—particularly drone warfare. This marks a shift from deterrence by punishment to deterrence by attrition.

The conflict also has a systemic economic dimension. Iran’s ability to disrupt energy infrastructure and maritime routes introduces volatility into global markets, making economic pressure a central instrument of warfare.

A further miscalculation involves the Gulf Arab states. While U.S. bases enhance defense, they also make host countries immediate targets. From Iran’s perspective, striking these sites and associated infrastructure is a logical way to impose costs. Recent attacks on energy facilities demonstrate that these states are no longer peripheral but active theaters in the conflict.

Endgame scenarios

Three main trajectories emerge. The first is a limited but high-intensity campaign in which the United States and Israel continues conducting targeted strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, missile systems, and key leadership nodes. The objective would be degradation rather than regime change, followed by an attempt at rapid de-escalation. While operationally feasible, such an approach risks producing only temporary effects, as Iran retains both the capacity and strategic incentive to rebuild.

The second trajectory involves internal destabilization within Iran. Sustained external pressure could exacerbate existing economic and political tensions, potentially leading to fragmentation within the regime. However, historical patterns indicate that external threats more often consolidate internal cohesion, particularly under conditions of war, rather than produce systemic collapse.

The third, and most likely, trajectory is one of prolonged attrition. In this scenario, Iran leverages asymmetric tools, maritime disruption, and economic targeting to impose sustained costs, while Israel and the United States rely on their superior military capabilities to contain and degrade threats. Over time, the cumulative weight of economic strain and domestic political pressures may push all parties toward some form of negotiated outcome.

Strategic outcome

Across all scenarios, decisive victory is unlikely. Israel and the United States can degrade Iran’s capabilities but not eliminate them; Iran cannot defeat its adversaries but can impose sustained costs. The result is a strategic stalemate—best described as managed incompleteness.

What is unfolding is not simply escalation but a systemic failure of deterrence. Any resulting equilibrium will likely remain unstable, characterized by persistent low-intensity conflict, unresolved nuclear tensions, and the growing role of economic warfare.


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