A declassified CIA report from 12 February 1965 offers a detailed account of how US intelligence assessed Soviet policy during one of the most volatile periods in the early years of the Republic of Cyprus.
The document, titled “Soviet Policy and Tactics in the Cyprus Dispute”, argued that the Soviet Union had exploited the Cyprus crisis to advance its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and weaken NATO. The report said Moscow had used tensions between Greece and Turkey while avoiding commitment to a specific final settlement.
The report was later circulated at the highest levels of the US administration. A 15 March 1965 memorandum from CIA Acting Director Marshall S. Carter to Defence Secretary Robert McNamara attached the February report and described it as an assessment of the way Moscow had exploited the Cyprus issue. Copies were also sent to other senior US officials, including McGeorge Bundy, Averell Harriman and George Ball.
Why Moscow opposed Enosis
According to the CIA assessment, the Soviet Union consistently opposed Enosis, or union of Cyprus with Greece.
The report said Moscow presented itself as a defender of Cyprus’ independence and territorial integrity, while its opposition to Enosis reflected wider strategic calculations. A union with Greece would have brought Cyprus into closer alignment with a NATO member.
The CIA also argued that Soviet public support gave the Makarios government an alternative source of international backing and allowed it to maintain greater independence from Athens. It stressed, however, that Moscow’s support was driven by political and strategic considerations rather than an inherent sympathy for the Greek Cypriots.
NATO and the British bases
The report identified weakening NATO’s southern flank as the primary Soviet objective in the Eastern Mediterranean.
It also identified the termination of Western military base rights in Cyprus as an immediate Soviet goal. According to the CIA, Soviet propaganda encouraged Greek Cypriot opposition to the continued presence of the British Sovereign Base Areas.
The report linked this policy to a wider Soviet effort to weaken political forces in Cyprus considered favourable to the West and strengthen AKEL, whose influence, it assessed, had grown considerably during 1964.
Spyros Kyprianou’s account of Moscow
The CIA assessment can be read alongside diplomatic records from the same period.
On 4 December 1964, Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou met US Secretary of State Dean Rusk in New York and described what he had heard during a visit to Moscow in September.
According to the US record of the conversation, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov had told Kyprianou that Moscow preferred Cyprus to remain an independent state. Kyprianou also reported that Kuznetsov had said the Soviet Union would respect the choice of the Cypriot people if they opted for Enosis.
The position reflected Moscow’s concern that Enosis would effectively place Cyprus within the Western alliance system.
When Nicosia sought Soviet military help
The crisis became particularly dangerous during the summer of 1964.
US diplomatic records show that following the Turkish air attacks and fighting in the Tylliria area in August, the Cypriot government informed the United States and Britain that it was seeking Soviet military intervention.
The Soviet Union subsequently offered assistance in the event of a foreign invasion, while avoiding an open commitment to intervene directly. The CIA later assessed that Moscow’s military support was limited and that the Soviet leadership remained cautious about becoming directly involved.
The episode nevertheless demonstrated the extent to which the Cyprus crisis had become entangled with the wider Cold War confrontation.
Moscow also courted Ankara
One of the more striking elements of the CIA report was its assessment that Moscow was simultaneously trying to improve relations with Turkey.
The CIA noted that the Soviet leadership had increasingly adopted a position favourable to Ankara on some aspects of the Cyprus dispute. This was part of a broader effort to reduce NATO’s military presence along the Soviet Union’s borders and improve diplomatic, economic and cultural ties with Turkey.
Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin visited Moscow from 30 October to 6 November 1964. A Soviet parliamentary delegation led by Nikolai Podgorny subsequently visited Turkey in January 1965.
The CIA viewed these contacts as evidence that Moscow was trying to maintain freedom of action between Ankara and Nicosia rather than committing itself exclusively to either side.
The Gromyko federation proposal
The Soviet position became even more complicated in January 1965.
On 21 January, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told Izvestia that the Cypriot people could choose a federal form of government that would take account of the position of the Greek and Turkish communities within a united and sovereign Cyprus.
The statement marked an important development because Moscow had previously placed much greater emphasis on independence, territorial integrity and opposition to Enosis.
The CIA interpreted Gromyko’s proposal as part of a broader attempt to balance competing interests. The report suggested that Moscow had underestimated the strength of the reaction in Athens and Nicosia to the word “federation”.
Makarios rejects federation
Archbishop Makarios rejected federation as a solution, arguing that it could not be applied to Cyprus because of the geographical distribution of the Turkish Cypriot population.
At the same time, he did not completely dismiss Gromyko’s statement. He said the Soviet foreign minister’s remarks could be interpreted in different ways and maintained that Moscow supported an independent Cyprus free from binding treaties.
The reaction in Cyprus was also reflected in the press. Haravgi, the AKEL newspaper, highlighted Gromyko’s references to the right of the Cypriot people to determine their own future and to Cyprus’ independence and sovereignty, while placing less emphasis on his reference to federation.
The newspaper’s coverage illustrates the sensitivity surrounding the shift in Soviet terminology at the time.
The wider Cold War calculation
The CIA report ultimately portrayed Moscow’s Cyprus policy as a balancing act.
The Soviet Union opposed Enosis and Western military bases, supported the independence of the Republic of Cyprus and cultivated relations with Makarios and AKEL. At the same time, it was seeking better relations with Turkey and avoiding commitments that could restrict its freedom of action.
The CIA concluded that Moscow had more to gain from continued tensions between Greece and Turkey than from helping secure a definitive settlement of the Cyprus dispute. It expected the Soviet Union to continue expanding its role in the Eastern Mediterranean while resisting solutions that would strengthen Western influence.
A document circulated at the top of Washington
The historical significance of the document also lies in its circulation within the US administration.
The March 1965 memorandum sent to McNamara specifically described the attached special report as an assessment of the Soviet position on the Cyprus dispute and Moscow’s exploitation of the issue. The distribution list included several senior officials across the US national security and foreign policy establishment.
The CIA report therefore provides a contemporaneous window into how US intelligence interpreted the Cyprus crisis while events were still unfolding, rather than a retrospective assessment written decades later.
Full report: CIA Reading Room – Soviet Policy and Tactics in the Cyprus Dispute
Also read: Kissinger tapes expose U.S. management of Cyprus in July 1974
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